Lookalike domains with MX records: the email risk
A lookalike with mail records can sit inside a supplier thread for weeks. More than a quarter of the registered lookalikes we checked could receive email.
Why mail matters more than the website
The lookalike that costs companies the most money rarely has a website. It has a mailbox. The pattern is familiar to anyone in accounts payable: a supplier's real invoice thread, then a reply from acme-supplies[.]co instead of acmesupplies.com, saying the bank details have changed. The FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center has put business email compromise losses at close to US$3 billion a year in its recent annual reports, more than almost any other category it tracks.
For that to work, the lookalike has to receive the replies. That is what MX records are for, and it is why a lookalike with mail records deserves attention before one with a parked web page.
How many lookalikes can receive email
Greyphish checks DNS, mail records and the website for lookalikes of the public brands it watches. Of the 716 registered lookalikes it checked in the 90 days to 1 October 2026:
| Evidence | Domains | Share |
|---|---|---|
| Mail records (MX) | 202 | 28.2% |
| Live website | 334 | 46.6% |
| Both mail and website | 142 | 19.8% |
| Mail but no website | 60 | 8.4% |
| Lookalike type | Registered | With MX |
|---|---|---|
| Homoglyph | 261 | 90 (34.5%) |
| Combosquat | 455 | 112 (24.6%) |
Counts use whole-word brand matches; an earlier version counted brand names inside other words.
Homoglyphs had mail records more often than combos, which fits their use: a name that reads as the real one is more useful in a From line than in an address bar. The 60 domains with mail and no website are the ones that a search for phishing sites will never surface.
Not every MX record is a threat. Some registrars and parking services add mail forwarding by default, and brand-protection registrars often configure mail on defensive registrations so that misdirected mail is caught. The record says the domain can receive mail; who reads it is the question.
How to check a lookalike's mail setup
Four lookups tell you most of what you need:
dig +short MX lookalike.example
dig +short A lookalike.example
dig +short TXT lookalike.example | grep spf
dig +short TXT _dmarc.lookalike.example| You see | What it means |
|---|---|
| MX records pointing at a mail provider | It can receive mail, including replies to a thread |
| MX "0 ." | Null MX (RFC 7505): it declares it accepts no mail |
| No MX but an A record | Senders fall back to the A record, so it may still receive mail |
| SPF "v=spf1 -all" | It claims to send no mail |
| SPF listing a provider | It is set up to send mail that will pass SPF |
| A DMARC record | Someone configured mail deliberately |
dnstwist's --mxcheck option goes a step further and tests whether the mail server would accept a message for the lookalike, which is a good way to check a whole list at once. See how to find lookalike domains.
Why your DMARC record does not help here
SPF, DKIM and DMARC on your own domain stop people sending mail that claims to be from yourcompany.com. They say nothing about yourcornpany[.]com. An attacker who registers a lookalike can publish their own SPF, sign with their own DKIM key and set their own DMARC policy, and their mail will pass authentication, because it genuinely comes from the domain it says it does.
Authentication proves the mail came from the domain in the From line. It does not prove that the domain is the one the reader thinks it is.
Also note that sending needs no MX record at all. A lookalike with no MX can still send a first message; it just cannot receive the reply. That is why the absence of MX lowers the risk without removing it.
What to put in place
- A callback rule for bank changes. Any change to payment details is confirmed by phone, on a number taken from the supplier record, never from the email. This one control defeats most invoice fraud regardless of the domain used.
- Lookalike rules on the mail gateway. Most gateways can flag or quarantine mail from domains close to your own and your top suppliers'. Feed them the lookalikes you find.
- First-contact and external-sender banners. A banner on mail from a domain nobody has corresponded with before is cheap and catches the switch from the real thread to the lookalike.
- Check your suppliers' names too. Attackers impersonate your vendors to you as often as they impersonate you to your customers. Run dnstwist against your largest suppliers' domains and tell them what you find.
- Brief the people who get targeted. Accounts payable, payroll and support should know the exact lookalikes of your name that exist.
Acting on a mail-capable lookalike
If a lookalike with MX records has been used, report it to the registrar with the message and full headers as evidence; suspension stops both sending and receiving. Also report the mail provider the MX records point to, since many hosted mail services will close the account. If it has not been used, block it on your gateway and keep it under watch. The takedown guide has the full sequence.
Every Greyphish finding shows whether the lookalike has mail records and a live site, so the mail-capable ones stand out in the daily digest. Watch one domain free, or every domain you own with Pro.
Questions
Can a domain send email without an MX record?
Yes. MX records only control where mail to the domain is delivered. A domain with no MX can still send mail, but replies to it will fail unless it has an A record that a mail server can fall back to.
Does DMARC protect against lookalike domains?
No. DMARC on your domain stops spoofing of your exact domain. A lookalike is a different domain that can set up its own SPF, DKIM and DMARC and pass authentication.
What is a null MX record?
An MX record of "0 ." defined in RFC 7505. It states that the domain accepts no email. Defensive registrations often publish one, together with an SPF record of v=spf1 -all.
How common are lookalike domains with MX records?
In Greyphish data for the 90 days to 1 October 2026, 28.2% of 716 registered lookalikes of public brands had mail records, and 8.4% had mail records but no website.
More guides
- How to find lookalike domains of your company
Generate the names an impersonator would pick, find out which already exist, and sort the handful that matter from the thousands that do not.
- What is combosquatting? Examples from 5,600 domains
A combosquat keeps the brand spelled correctly and adds a word around it. They are the newest lookalikes we see when they appear, often only days old.
- Homoglyph and punycode domains, explained
A homoglyph domain swaps a letter for one that looks the same. Some swaps stay in plain ASCII; others need Unicode and travel as punycode.
- Monitoring Certificate Transparency logs for phishing domains
Every publicly trusted certificate is logged before browsers accept it. That makes the logs one of the earliest public signs that a lookalike is being set up.
- Someone registered a domain like yours: what to do
Most lookalikes never do anything. The ones that do need evidence, the right abuse contact and a little patience. Here is the order that works.
Numbers in these guides come from the lookalike domain report, which updates hourly. Plans and limits are on the pricing page.